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Introduction 
On December 18, 2005, Evo Morales won 54 percent of the vote in Bolivia’s presidential election, 
outpacing his closest rival by twenty-five percentage points. For a number of reasons, the 
outcome of this closely-watched election was stunning. 
First, the victory of Morales meant that he would become Bolivia’s first ever indigenous president. 
Though the country has the largest indigenous population in South America, with approximately 
67 percent of Bolivians identifying as indigenous, its political life has long been dominated by 
white and mestizo minorities.[1] Bolivia has experienced countless regime changes in its nearly 
two centuries as an independent republic, shifting back and forth between constitutional and 
authoritarian rule, but until now all presidents—democratic and de facto alike—have come from 
an ethnic group other than that of the majority of Bolivians.  
The victory of an indigenous candidate in 2005 did not materialize out of thin air. Over the course 
of the 1990s, indigenous groups in Bolivia mobilized to claim political roles that have traditionally 
been denied to them. For example, numerous indigenous leaders were elected as mayors in the 
late 1990s after Bolivia enacted a municipal decentralization law in 1994, and the country 
inaugurated its first indigenous vice-president, Victor Hugo Cárdenas, in 1993. These gains are 
certainly important; indeed the municipal victories of Morales’ party helped pave the way for its 
national victory in 2005. But the concentration of power in the executive branch in Bolivia means 
that Morales’ presidential victory marks a truly historic juncture.  
Second, Morales stunned the world not just because he won the election, but because he won it 
so handily. In the months and weeks preceding the election, virtually every poll indicated that 
Morales would come in first, but only in the range of three to seven percentage points ahead of 
his closest rival. For example, the most widely-cited poll predicted that 36 percent of the vote 
would go to Morales and that 30 percent would go to center-right candidate and former President 
Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga.[2] According to the electoral rules established in the Bolivian constitution, 
such an outcome would have thrown the decision to Congress, which is authorized to select the 
president from among the top two vote-getters when no candidate wins an absolute majority.  
Thanks to the fragmentation of Bolivia’s traditional party system, every president since the 
transition to democracy in 1982 has been selected by the legislature, subsequent to the post-
electoral negotiation of pacts between parties that are more common in parliamentary regimes. 
Morales’ convincing victory rendered moot the months of pre-electoral speculation about how 
Congress—one of the country’s most discredited institutions—would behave if given the chance 
to choose between Evo and Tuto. Would Congress choose not to pick the first-place finisher as 
president, as it had often done in the past? If so, how would the social movements and civil 
society organizations identified with Morales respond? In the event, so many Bolivians voted for 
Morales that Congress played no role in the selection of the president. For this reason, it was not 
just the fact of Morales’ victory that was remarkable but the form that his victory took, which 
enabled the new president to claim a greater mandate than any of his predecessors in the 
democratic period initiated in 1982. 
In addition to these reasons, the results of the Bolivian election were particularly significant for the 
United States because of Morales’ well-known opposition to U.S.-supported policies in the areas 
of drug eradication and economic liberalization. In response, some commentators in the United 
States have argued that the election of Morales is reason enough to suspend aid to Bolivia, to 
consider economic sanctions against his government, and to offer support for neighboring 
countries that might feel threatened by a Morales regime.[3] Other observers conclude that the 
most important aspect of the December election is the additional proof it provides of Hugo 
Chávez’s growing and pernicious influence in the region. In the campaign, Morales expressed his 
admiration for both Chávez and Fidel Castro.[4] Still others see the Bolivian election largely 
through the lens of Latin America’s shift to the left in recent years, which fails to appreciate some 
of the uniquely Bolivian features of Morales’ upset and often reflects an inaccurately monolithic 
view of leftist leaders in the region.[5] 
While the Morales presidency will certainly pose several challenges to the United States, this 
essay attempts to offer a more balanced view by paying closer attention to the domestic logic of 
his electoral victory. Putting the December election in historical context suggests that the Morales 
presidency represents opportunities as well as challenges, both of which the U.S. government 
must keep in mind as it seeks ways to promote its twin overarching goals for Bolivia: democratic 
consolidation and broad-based economic development. 
Why Evo Won: The Road to the 2005 Election  
In order to understand Morales’ strong performance in the December 2005 election, some of the 
major political and economic transformations that Bolivia experienced in the preceding two 
decades deserve special attention. Many of these changes were positive, including the 
deepening of a culture of compromise between political parties that enhanced governability, and 
the successful maintenance of macroeconomic stability beginning in 1985. Several developments 
in this period, however, were negative—including the breach that widened between the country’s 
traditional political parties and its increasingly vigorous civil society, and the reality that few 
Bolivians benefited much from the adoption of neoliberal economic policies. The decidedly mixed 
record of the 1985-2005 period helps explain Morales’ appeal, but it also challenges the 
misleading view that Morales threatens a political and economic order that was mostly 
advantageous. Closer attention to the two decades before 2005 forces us to question both those 
who see Evo as a savior and the victory of his party as a panacea for Bolivia’s ills, and those who 
believe that his victory represents either the “end of Bolivia” or its “last days.”[6]  
On the political front, the victory of Evo’s Movement Toward Socialism party (Movimiento al 
socialismo or MAS) is more accurately understood as a rejection of Bolivia’s bankrupt political 
establishment than as evidence of the influence of foreign leaders, whether Cuban or Venezuelan. 
After the disastrous administration of leftist President Hernán Siles Suazo between 1982 and 
1985, three main political parties dominated politics in the two decades that followed: the 
Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario or MNR), the 
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria or MIR), and 
Nationalist Democratic Action (Acción Democrática Nacionalista or ADN). Despite their 
misleading names, each of these parties was in reality a rightist or center-right party dominated 
by a handful of national leaders who shifted in and out of the presidency. In the absence of a 
majority winner, the Congressional selection of the president in 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, and 
2002 meant that each president owed his presidency to the inter-party pacts that had been 
negotiated in Congress. While defenders of these pacts argue that they produced smoother 
executive -legislative relations in Bolivia than in other presidential democracies in the region, 
critics noted that these pacts tended to reinforce clientelism, corruption, and personalism within 
political parties.[7]  
The dependence on patronage politics made Bolivia governable in the 1990s, but the obsession 
of political parties with the division of spoils ultimately hindered their ability to react to widespread 
changes in the country’s civil society. The thickening of civil society was particularly pronounced 
in indigenous communities, where neoliberal state reforms and the collapse of the mineral 
economy sparked new forms of organization and protest.[8] Adopted as part of the region-wide 
trend of decentralization in 1994, Bolivia’s Law of Popular Participation gave indigenous civil 
society organizations new opportunities to participate in municipal politics and a degree of 
independence from established political parties that they had never enjoyed.[9] Many of these 
new organizations formed the building blocks that would enable Evo Morales to transform the 
MAS into a party with national reach, rather than one confined to his home base in the coca-
growing region of Cochabamba. In this respect, decentralization deserves to be considered an 
important factor in Morales’ emergence, in addition to the deeply unpopular coca eradication 
policies that were aggressively pursued by President Hugo Banzer (1997-2001) and aggressively 
opposed by the MAS. 
Bolivia’s 2002 election brought into sharp relief the growing disconnect between the country’s 
established political parties and the indigenous groups who were increasingly mobilized and yet 
still locked out of key decision-making institutions at the national level. In the 2002 presidential 
and legislative elections, voters repudiated Banzer’s ADN and gave the MAS more votes than 
any other party except the MNR, a surprisingly strong showing for such a new party.[10] In the 
days following the election, however, MNR candidate and former President Gonzalo Sánchez de 
Losada (1993-1997) engineered an alliance with two minor parties in Congress in order to secure 
his return to the presidency. In the 15 months that his second presidential administration lasted 
(July 2002- October 2003), Sánchez de Losada sidelined MAS legislators from the policymaking 
process within Congress and demonstrated little interest in dialogue with the democratic 
opposition.[11]  
Its access blocked within the political system, the MAS participated in a series of protests, 
blockades and hunger strikes in February and October 2003 that paralyzed the country and its 
economy. Over sixty Bolivians died when the president called in the military to end these protests, 
which deepened the opposition to his continued rule by an even broader set of civil society 
organizations and eventually forced his resignation and exile. The further discrediting of the 
country’s traditional parties under Sánchez de Losada, combined with the unwillingness of these 
parties to grant the MAS institutionalized access to decision making channels, are critical in 
understanding why so many voters threw their support behind Morales in the 2005 elections. 
Many believed that only an overwhelming victory at the polls would guarantee his party 
meaningful access to national political institutions. 
On the economic front, Morales’ electoral victory reflects his ability to harness growing opposition 
to one of the most radical liberalization programs to be introduced in Latin America. Neoliberal 
policies were consistently adopted and defended by the three established political parties that 
governed between 1985 and 2003, none of which was able to respond effectively to demands 
among average Bolivians for a less doctrinaire implementation of market -oriented economics. 
While the reaction against neoliberalism can be seen in countries across Latin America, in Bolivia 
the anti-market backlash has focused intensely on policies toward the country’s natural 
resources—oil and natural gas in particular. In his first administration, Sánchez de Losada signed 
a new Hydrocarbons Law in 1994 that dramatically reduced the role of the state-owned oil 
company relative to transnational corporations, and that substantially lowered taxes on profits 
from new oil and gas fields. In response to these incentives for exploration, foreign oil companies 
discovered extensive new gas deposits in Bolivia and proceeded to exploit these reserves on 
terms that were some of the most generous in the world.[12]  
Upon his return to the presidency in 2002, Sánchez de Losada proposed the construction of a 
new gas pipeline through Chile in order to increase much-needed export revenues. In addition to 
growing resentment about the handsome profits that foreign companies were earning from 
Bolivian gas, Chile’s role in this project alienated Bolivians because it was to that country that 
Bolivia had lost its coastal access in the 19th century War of the Pacific. When Morales took up 
the mantle of those who wanted greater benefits for Bolivians from Bolivian gas, what ensued 
was the so-called Gas War (guerra del gas), that precipitated the ouster of Sánchez de Losada. 
In the subsequent, interim administration of Carlos Mesa (October 2003-June 2005), Bolivia’s 
Constitutional Tribunal ruled that most of the contracts signed under the 1994 law had not been 
approved by Congress and were consequently invalid, after which Congress passed a new 
Hydrocarbons Law that increased taxes on oil and gas from new fields. While the ruling and the 
new law in 2005 infuriated the oil transnationals, the MAS opposed the new law for not going far 
enough in asserting the state’s rights vis-à-vis natural resources.  
Thus, Morales was able to position himself in the December 2005 election as a defender of 
national interests relative to transnational interests, a stance that substantially contributed to his 
victory. Considering that Bolivia absolutely needs foreign capital in order to exploit its natural 
resources and that it desperately needs revenues from these resources in order to develop, 
Morales’ highly combative stance has undeniably and profoundly complicated the future of this 
important industry.[13] At the same time, the questionable legality and excessively generous 
terms of the contracts that Morales’ predecessors signed with gas companies—together with the 
non-renewable nature of the resource in question—make it easier to understand why so many 
Bolivians supported his more nationalist and recalcitrant position. 
Where Evo Won: Regional Polarization within Bolivia 
According to the analysis presented above, the election of Morales was the culmination of a deep 
rejection of Bolivia’s established political parties, which became increasingly divorced from civil 
society in the 1990s and unable to offer meaningful economic policy alternatives. While this 
rejection of Bolivia’s political establishment was a genuinely national phenomenon, it did not 
translate into equal levels of support for Morales across Bolivia’s nine subnational regions. 
Instead, the presidential vote revealed a pronounced geographic split in Bolivia, with Morales 
winning in the five western and Andean departments and Quiroga taking first place in the four 
lowland departments that curve around the foothills of the Andes in the eastern half of the 
country.[14] In other words, while Bolivia’s traditional parties performed poorly throughout the 
country, in the east more voters preferred not Morales’ MAS but the new center-right political 
party created by Quiroga (PODEMOS or Poder Democrático Social). A closer look reveals that 
Morales’ strong showing overall masks a worrisome and worsening process of regional 
polarization within Bolivia, which rightfully deserves to be considered one of the most important 
forces at play not just in the 2005 election but in the country’s ongoing political crisis. 
There is nothing new about conflict between regions in Bolivia; these are as old as the republic 
itself. Over the course of the nineteenth century, for instance, the country experienced a series of 
boom and bust cycles in different commodity exports that generated sharply different 
consequences for emerging and declining regions. When, at the end of that century, the decline 
of silver and the rise of tin led to a civil war between Chuquisaca and La Paz departments, La 
Paz proceeded to use its victory in the conflict as the basis for the construction of a highly 
centralized state. After 1900, conflict between subnational regions took a back seat to a series of 
other, nationally-articulated conflicts that dominated Bolivian politics for the rest of the 20th 
century—conflicts between classes, between civilians and generals, and between nationally-
organized political parties. In the 1950s and '60s, the La Paz-based central government used 
revenues derived from the mineral wealth of Andean departments in the west, and channeled 
these resources into development projects in the sparsely-populated, lowland department of 
Santa Cruz in the east. Assisted by the U.S. Agency for International Development, the central 
government’s “March to the East” resulted in large investments in Santa Cruz’s infrastructure, 
including the critical highway and railway projects that helped produce a sustained regional 
economic boom beginning in the 1970s.  
The phenomenal rise of Santa Cruz, now home to the country’s most efficient and lucrative export 
activities, has generated deep conflict between what many see as two different Bolivias: the 
poorer, more indigenous, less economically productive departments of the mountainous west and 
the richer, whiter and more economically vibrant departments in the lowlands to the east. 
Bolivians in the east and west disagree about many things, including even how to explain Santa 
Cruz’ success. Residents of western departments remind Santa Cruz of the role that eastern 
mineral wealth played in its growth, and demand that eastern departments now share the 
proceeds of their newly-discovered natural gas deposits with the west.[15] Meanwhile, residents 
of Santa Cruz argue that it is the absence of the central state and its overweening bureaucracy 
that enabled the department to grow faster than the national average, rather than any favors from 
La Paz. 
Tensions between east and west noticeably worsened in the aftermath of Sánchez de Losada’s 
disastrous second administration. In the October 2003 Gas War, when indigenous groups in the 
west besieged the president in La Paz, pro-market business and political leaders in the east 
responded by inviting the president to transfer the national capital to Santa Cruz.[16] When this 
proposal failed, and the following administration of Carlos Mesa began to negotiate directly with 
Evo Morales, the Santa Cruz leadership proceeded to organize a series of rallies, protests, and 
signature-gathering campaigns to demand greater autonomy from the central government.[17] 
Demands for regional autonomy certainly pre-date Morales’ national emergence, but they have 
escalated sharply in response to the growing political turbulence in La Paz.  
In the two years that elapsed between the ouster of Sánchez de Losada and the election of Evo 
Morales, political actors in different parts of Bolivia polarized around two sets of rival electoral 
demands. Having succeeded in removing Sánchez de Losada, groups in the west prioritized 
elections for a constituent assembly that would enable them to leverage their newfound political 
power into constitutional changes in electoral rules (e.g. reserved congressional seats for 
indigenous Bolivians) and economic policy (e.g. the nationalization of the oil and gas industry). In 
contrast, the Santa Cruz leadership opposed a constituent assembly and favored instead the 
holding of a referendum on departmental autonomy that would be binding at the departmental 
level. In the end, neither group achieved its preferred outcome—the vote that was held in 
December 2005 was for executive and legislative offices, with the election of a constituent 
assembly and the vote on departmental autonomy tentatively scheduled to take place on the 
same day in July 2006. For those in Santa Cruz who are concerned about Morales’ anti-market 
positions and who want local control over natural resources, this electoral sequencing is 
significant. December 18, 2005 demonstrated that Morales could easily win a national election 
without winning in any of the four lowland departments, an outcome that may well increase 
support in those departments for the autonomy referendum if and when it is held.  
What Evo’s Victory Means: Implications for Bolivian Democracy 
When Evo Morales won the December election in a landslide, the U.S. State Department 
responded by stating that the future relationship between Bolivia and the United States will 
depend on the policies that his government pursues.[18] Critical here are the choices that 
Morales makes in the coming months about how to use the tremendous political capital that his 
victory has generated. The new president comes to the office with greater popular support than 
any of his seven democratic predecessors. This unavoidable political reality could generate either 
positive or negative consequences for his governing style and policy choices, and hence for the 
quality of the U.S.-Bolivia relationship.  
On the one hand, there are reasons to be optimistic about what the particularly strong showing of 
Morales’ MAS party means for his administration. In the past, the absence of a majority winner in 
the presidential race meant that the individual eventually selected as president owed his very job 
to the extensive horse-trading and pork-barreling agreements that were cobbled together in 
Congress. This practice placed intense pressure on the national budget and severely 
compromised the quality of the bureaucracy since top bureaucrats were typically picked for 
political reasons. Bolivians refer to this practice derisively as the “political quota” system (cuoteo 
político), the repudiation of which contributed significantly to the virtual disappearance of the 
country’s traditional parties in the period since 2000. The manner of Morales’ election represents 
an historic opportunity to break with this tradition, precisely because his authority as president 
does not derive from opaque deals with opposition parties in Congress. Furthermore, in the past 
the use of party pacts—and the successive inclusion and exclusion of specific parties in these 
pacts at different points in time—made it difficult for voters to determine which party should be 
held accountable for inferior performance. In contrast, the 2005 election results may enhance the 
prospects for accountability in Bolivia because Morales and the MAS know that they alone will be 
held responsible for the quality of governance in the next five years. It will be hard for the MAS to 
play the same blame game that has obscured responsibility in the past. 
Apart from the strength of his showing in the election, the “mere” act of governing is likely to 
produce a fair amount of moderation in Morales’ program of government. In fact, one of the 
clearest patterns in the last two decades of electoral democracy in Latin America is that the often 
extremist views of opposition leaders almost always become substantially more pragmatic once 
these leaders swear the oath as president. Even on the campaign trail, there were signs of a 
moderation in the MAS platform, as reflected in Morales’ attacks on cocaine traffickers and in his 
assurances that he would leave the oil and gas transnationals alone, despite talk of 
nationalization.[19] It is also the case that Morales’ huge victory at the polls gives him significant 
authority within the MAS that he can use to rein in the party’s more radical elements, including 
those who disparaged his willingness to sustain a dialogue in 2004 and 2005 with President 
Carlos Mesa, former vice-president to Sánchez de Losada.  
On the other hand, while the overwhelming popular support for the MAS means that it will not 
have to engage in traditional and costly patronage politics in Congress, it may also create 
incentives for dangerously majoritarian politics. Presidentialism as a form of government routinely 
produces winner-take-all outcomes, but this outcome is particularly hazardous when a 
traditionally fragmented party system suddenly produces a majority winner.[20] Morales is free 
not only from the patronage deals that had to precede the passage of every major piece of 
legislation in earlier administrations, he is also free from the type of substantive policy 
compromises that would be best for Bolivia’s fragile democracy. The parallel here with Salvador 
Allende, who sought a major transformation of Chile’s political economy in the early 1970s with 
only 36 percent of the vote, is technically inaccurate given the much higher level of electoral 
support that has swept Morales into the presidency.[21] Yet many of the same lessons distilled 
from the Chilean case apply to Bolivia, particularly since Bolivian political institutions are too weak 
to offer much in the way of checks and balances vis-à-vis a triumphalist president.  
Furthermore, whereas Allende headed a party that had a separate existence and a well-
developed organizational structure, Morales personally dominates the more fluid MAS to a far 
greater extent. The real fear is not that the MAS will come under the thumb of either Fidel Castro 
or Hugo Chávez, but less sensationally that it will replicate the highly personalist patterns of 
Bolivia’s discredited traditional parties. Continued personalism would be especially problematic if 
it is combined with the marginalization of the legislature—together with the center-right 
democratic opposition that it now houses—from the policy making process. 
Finally, the possibility of majoritarian behavior by Morales is dangerous because it would likely 
produce a dramatic reaction from the powerhouse department of Santa Cruz. In effect, one of the 
few real checks on the new president comes not from a political institution, but rather from the 
entire eastern half of the country. The movement in Santa Cruz to separate from Bolivia will grow 
if the central government, now under Morales’ control, balks at holding the nation-wide 
referendum on regional autonomy that was agreed to by his predecessor.[22] A key concern in 
2006 is whether the new president will seek to cancel this referendum or, perhaps just as 
troubling to Santa Cruz leaders, to postpone it until after the election of a new constituent 
assembly that is likely to be dominated by the MAS.  
Though the Bolivian armed forces have repeatedly warned Santa Cruz that they will act to protect 
the country’s current borders and territorial integrity, failure to hold the autonomy referendum as 
scheduled is likely to swell the ranks of the separatist movement. Considering that Bolivia 
remains one of the continent’s most centralized polities, the new MAS government can 
contemplate the granting of additional powers to the regions without compromising the goals that 
it has set for the country. The hope is that Morales’ indisputable electoral strength—together with 
the fact that he still won 33 percent of the vote in Santa Cruz even though he lost the department 
to Quiroga—will remind him in the years to come that he is president of all of Bolivia, and of all 
Bolivians. 
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